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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW-1953

or by 'any person aggrieved or by any officer of the township [other than
members of the board as such] affected by any decision of the administrative officer.' "14
FRANKIIN C LATCHAM

AGENCY
The case law in this field reveals an unusually wide variety of problems.
While the title is "agency" the cases discussed have rather indiscriminately
dealt with the problems of agent and principal and master and servant. No
effort has been made to classify the cases on this basis.

Acts Within the Scope of Authority
In Kalis v. Henlen Bros. Co.,' the court of appeals held that a soliciting
agent had no implied authority to collect or receive payment and therefore
payment to such an agent by a purchaser, in the absence of other circumstances indicative of authority to collect or receive payment was at his
peril.
Ehrlich v. Willis Music Co.,2 presents an unusual factual situation regarding the apparent authority of a salesman in a retail store. By mistake
the defendant had advertised a television set for a price less than one tenth
its proper selling price. The plaintiff had knowledge at the time of the
alleged purchase which would justify the reasonable conclusion that the
apparent authority of the agent did not extend to a sale at such a drastic
reduction. While recognizing that the salesman was clothed with apparent
authority to sell in the ordinary course of business, the court concluded that
the same principle which excludes a selling agent from making a gift also
excluded him from selling at such a grossly undervalued price.
One case3 involved the familiar special agent rule that a person who
deals with a known special agent must acquaint himself with the extent of
the agenes authority. In this particular case a special agent had authority
to collect rent on leased property and to make minor repairs; this did not
'92 Ohio App. 347, 110 N.E.2d 157 (1952).
^93 Ohio App. 246, 113 N.E.2d 252 (1953). The court recognized that it was a
question of fact whether under all the circumstances this selling agent had authority
to bind the defendant to make the sale at this ridiculously low price, and concluded
that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that
the defendant was not bound.
'.Price Bros. Co. v. Walters, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 442, 115 N.E.2d 12 (App. 1951). The
action was by a mechanic s lien daimant, and it was determined that such a daimant
-could have standing only if it had a contract with the owner or with an agent acting
within the scope of his authority.
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vest him with either implied or apparent authority to bind the owner to pay
for the construction of a new garage on the premises of the leased properties.
Agency by Estoppel
In Combs v. Kobacker Stores, Inc.,4 the doctrine of agency by estoppel
was applied. The evidence disclosed that the Boston Store had rented the
shoe department to Epko Stores, Inc., and that the clerk whose conduct
formed the basis of this action was an employee of the latter, but this fact
was not known to the plaintiff until after suit was filed. The court held
that the defendant could not under these circumstances deny that the clerk
was its agent by showing that he was in fact the employee of the lessee of the
shoe department'
Undisclosed Agency
In Bader v. Corbm,6 the plaintiff sustained injuries in the course of a hair
treatment in a beauty parlor by an operator who was not known to be an
employee of the defendant. In such a situation it was held the party who
dealt with the undisclosed agent could, upon discovery, elect to sue either the
principal or the individual with whom he dealt.
Another case applied the rule that the agent of the undisclosed principal
is personally liable on the contracts which he has executed. Thus in Datko
v Gieb7 the court of appeals held that such an agent by making a contract
in his own name is bound by his contract, and that an infant with whom he
dealt had the right to look to him for the return of the purchase price upon
disaffirmance.
Agent's Duty to Principal
Two cases were concerned with the continuing duty or loyalty of the
agent after termination of the relationship. In Worley v. Stoltz8 defendant
'65 Ohio L Abs. 326, 114 N.E.2d 447 (App. 1953). It was also determined in
this case that there was evidence sufficient for the jury as to whether the clerk was
acting within the scope of his employment while attempting to protect his master's
property under his control where the clerk was just outside the entrance door at the
time he stopped the plaintiff and took he. to the store office.
'In Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co., 138 Ohio St. 178, 34 N.E.2d 202, 203 (1941)
a very similar situation existed. Paragraph 1 of the syllabus in that case is as follows:
'"Where the proprietor of a provision market advertises an article for sale in his
market and a purchaser in reliance that he was buying from such proprietor and
without knowledge to the coatrary, buys such advertised article at a counter in the
market which the proprietor had leased to another, which counter was the only place
in the market where the article in question was to be found, the doctrine of agency by
estoppel applies, and in an action against such proprietor for injuries resulting from

such sale, the proprietor will not be heard to deny that the lessee of the counter space
was proprietor's agent."
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made a warranty of a used automobile in the presence of the plaintiff who
was the salesman showing the auto. There was in fact a breach of warranty.
The plaintiff settled with the customer, taking an assignment of the right of
action for damages. Plaintiff used no confidential information which he
acquired by reason of his employment, and his employment ceased when the
particular sale was concluded. Under these circumstances, it was held that
no further duty remained to be performed and that the plaintiff was at
liberty to enter into a contract with the purchaser, take an assignment of the
claim and sue the defendant.
An interesting injunction and habeas corpus case0 evoked a decision
from the court of appeals concerning the duty of an employee with regard
to trade secrets of a former employer after the employment relationship has
terminated. The court held that the former employer had failed to make a
prima facie showing that the defendant had wrongfully appropriated its
business or trade secrets. It also said that defendant had no right to inspect
trade secrets of the employee. The rationale is that in the absence of a
restrictive covenant, no implied obligation rests on an employee not to disclose or use the trade secrets of his employer that have not been entrusted to
him in confidence and, under such circumstances, an employee who has
quit the service of his employer may use in his own business or the business
of another his experience, skill, acumen, memory and general knowledge.
It is only when particular trade secrets of an employer have been entrusted
to the employee in confidence in the course of his employment that the law
implies an obligation on the part of the employee not to disclose or use such
trade secrets in any manner that would amount to a breach of that confidence
or of good faith.
Miscellaneous
In Elksns v. Wheeling & Lake Erne Ry. 10 the supreme court applied the
Federal Employers' Liability Act to an injury incurred by an employee of the
defendant while spotting a railroad car on the premises of another company.
In the first place, the employer owes a duty of furnishing a reasonably safe
place to work even though the employee is sent upon the premises of another. Second, the standard of care in such a case is one for the jury to determine according to its finding of whether the employer's conduct measures
up to what a reasonable and prudent person would have done under the
"115 N.E.2d 711 (Ohio App. 1952). The court relied upon the leading case of
Thayer v. Luce, 22 Ohio St. 62 (1871).
7113 N.E.2d 672 (Ohio App. 1953).
'64 Ohio L Abs. 457, 113 N.E.2d 28 (App. 1952).
'Perfect Measuring Tape Co. v. Notheis, 93 App. 507, 114 N.E.2d 149 (1953)
"0160 Oliio St. 47, 113 N.E.2d 233 (1953).

